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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The Idaho Board of Correction, Idaho Department of Correction, and Jeffrey R. Ray, Public
Information Officer (Respondents-Appellants-Cross Respondents - hereinafter "Respondents")
appeal the district court's determination that one document (Trial Exhibit 40, Bates No. 654) at
issue in a Public Records Act proceeding is not exempt and thus subject to public disclosure.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On September 21, 2017, Professor Aliza Cover sent an email to Jeffrey Ray, Public
Information Officer, at the Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"), requesting "records and
information about" three categories of records: (1) "The most current IDOC protocol for
executions"; (2) "The drugs that have been or will be purchased/used in future executions
(including identifying information about the drugs; drug labels; expiration dates; purchase
orders/receipts; paperwork about how the drugs are to be stored; etc.)"; and (3) "The use oflethal
injection in the Rhoades and Leavitt executions (including paperwork about where IDOC got its
drugs from, and communications with drug suppliers or others regarding acquisition of drugs."
(Exhibits, p. 7 1) The parties stipulated prior to trial that Cover's request was a legitimate public
records request. (R., p. 1445, ,i 322). Ray provided information or records responsive to Cover's
request on September 22, 2017 (R., p. 1434, ,i 4) and September 27, 2017 (R., p. 1434, ,i 5). The
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Citations to "Exhibits." refer to the exhibits requested on appeal, which can be found in the PDF
file with the title starting "Conf.Exhibits-Cover." The page numbering on this page of the exhibit
is cut off in this record. The preceding page is numbered 6 and the following page is numbered 8.
2

Citations to "R.. " refer to the initial record filed October 18, 2019, which can be found in the
PDF file with the title "Clerk-Cover."
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parties stipulated that Respondents provided an incomplete set of records responsive to Cover's
request. (R., p. 1435, ,i 8).
On February 27, 2018, Cover filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandate with the Ada County
District Court, seeking to compel the disclosure of the public records that Cover had requested but
not received. (R., p. 1435, ,i 9). On May 14, 2018, following a Show Cause hearing, the district
court entered an Order Granting Peremptory Writ of Mandate Requiring Disclosure of Some
Records and a Peremptory Writ of Mandate. Following a hearing on Respondents' Motion to
Reconsider the court's writ of mandate, the district court vacated the writ and part of the order on
September 17, 2018. (R., p. 1436, ,i 13). The matter was subsequently scheduled for a court trial
to consider whether Respondents were justified in withholding certain records as exempt.
Between March 14, 2018, and December 20, 2018, Respondents disclosed numerous
additional records in response to Cover's September 21, 2017, request. (R., p. 1436, ,i 14). Many
of these records were duplicative, and some were not responsive to Cover's request but were
provided in the interest of transparency. One document that was provided only in heavily, almost
fully, redacted form was the document at Trial Exhibit 40, Bates Number 654. Trial Exhibit 40,
Bates Number 654 is a letter that identifies a source of lethal injection chemicals that was used in
the 2012 Leavitt execution. (Trial Transcript, pp. 324-325, Ls. 24-2 3). However, the letter itself
confirms a receipt of funds and a commitment to make chemicals available for a period of time
after the date of the letter. (Trial Transcript, p. 218, Ls. 23-25). No lethal injection chemicals were
received in response to the commitment represented by Trial Exhibit 40, Bates Number 654. (Trial

Citations to "Trial Transcript" refer to the transcript of the court trial, lodged on October 15,
2019, which can be found in the PDF file with the title "Trans.-Cover." This brief will refer to the
page numbers on the transcript itself rather than the document (which contains the transcripts of
more than one hearing).
3
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Transcript, p. 221, L. 2). Respondents withheld this document on the basis it is exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) and Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IDAPA) 06.01.01.135.06, which specifically exempts certain records that, if disclosed, could
jeopardize the ability of the department to carry out executions.
The district court held a court trial on Cover's Verified Petition for a Writ of Mandate to
Compel Disclosure of Public Records between January 28 and February 4, 2019. (Am.R., p.
1824. 4). Before beginning her case-in-chief, Cover moved under Rule 41(b) to grant Petitioner's
verified petition. (Am.R., p. 1824). The district court granted that motion in part and ordered the
release of certain documents or portions of documents, including the entirety of Trial Exhibit 40,
Bates Number 654. The district court then reconsidered its decision, upon Respondents' motion,
as to Exhibit 40, page 654, and the trial proceeded. (Am.R., p. 1824).
On March 21, 2019, the district court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.
(Am.R., p. 1824). The district court concluded that Respondents had failed to meet their burden
of demonstrating a reasonable probability that harm could result from public disclosure of some
of the previously withheld or redacted documents, or had failed to demonstrate that certain
documents were withheld pursuant to a narrowly tailored exemption. One of the documents for
which the district court concluded Respondents had failed to meet their burden was Exhibit 40,
page 654. (Am.R., p. 1888). Specifically, the district court determined that Respondents provided
only evidence of a generalized harm that may result from the public disclosure of Exhibit 40, page
654, and failed to demonstrate that the interest in confidentiality or security outweighed the public
interest in disclosure. (Am.R., p. 1888).

Citations to "Am.R.. " refer to the amended record, which can be found in the PDF file with the
title "AmendedClerk.-Cover."
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The district court filed its Peremptory Writ of Mandate requiring the disclosure of certain
documents on March 21, 2019. (R., pp. 1608-1611). Respondents complied with this Writ on May
17, 2019, as noted by Respondents' Declaration Certifying Compliance with Writ filed on that
date. (R., p. 1817-1822).

The only document the district court ordered to be released that

Respondents continued to withhold was Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654, pursuant to the district court's
Order Granting Stay Pending Appeal, filed June 21, 2019.
Respondents timely appealed the district court's determination as to Exhibit 40, Bates
Number 654.

4

ISSUES

I.

Whether the district court erred in determining the document located at Trial
Exhibit 40, Bates 654, is a public record not subject to exemption from
public disclosure pursuant to Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) and Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) 06.01.01.135.06, and must
therefore be disclosed to Petitioner-Respondent.

II.

Whether Appellants are entitled to their costs on appeal.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The district court erred in determining the document located at Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654, is a
public record not subject to exemption from public disclosure pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74105(4)(a)(i) and Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) 06.01.01.135.06, and must
therefore be disclosed to Petitioner-Respondent.

A.

Introduction
The district court determined that the Respondents failed to meet their burden at trial of

demonstrating that Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654 is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to a
narrowly defined exemption to the Idaho Public Records Act which exempts certain records that,
if disclosed, could jeopardize the ability of the department to carry out executions. The district
court first applied an erroneous standard of review, conflating the Public Records Act proceeding
with an APA-style review of the agency's rule-making. Applying this standard, the district court
determined that Board Rule 135.06 itself did not create a valid exemption to the Public Records
Act. The district court erred in applying this standard to invalidate Board Rule 135.06, as a Public
Records Act proceeding is not the appropriate forum to challenge agency rule-making, and the
only inquiry for a district court in such a proceeding is whether specific records fall into narrowlyconstrued exemptions to the Public Records Act.
After applying that erroneous standard and finding that Board Rule 135.06 did not create a
valid exemption to the Public Records Act, the district court erroneously conducted its own
weighing pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i). This weighing was erroneous for two reasons.
First, the district court was not entitled to conduct its own weighing of the public interests
described in Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i), but rather should have deferred to the Board of
Correction's statutorily granted rule-making authority. Second, even if the district court was
entitled to conduct its own weighing pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i), the district court's

6

finding that the public interest in confidentiality did not clearly outweigh the public interest in
disclosure related to Exhibit 40, Bates 654 was not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Specifically, the district court concluded that Respondents did not show a significant
public interest in confidentiality as Respondents provided evidence of only a generalized harm that
could result from the public disclosure of Exhibit 40, page 654, rather than specific evidence
demonstrating a reasonable probability that harm could result from the disclosure. Respondents
dispute this finding and submit the district court's conclusion is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Finally, Respondents submit the overwhelming weight of the evidence
adduced at trial demonstrates that Respondents met their burden of demonstrating that Trial
Exhibit 40, page 654 is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to a narrowly defined exemption
to the Idaho Public Records Act and that a specific harm would be reasonably probable to result if
the record were publicly disclosed.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from denial of a public records request, the findings of the district court will not

be disturbed on appeal if those findings are based on substantial and competent evidence. Hymas
v. Meridian Police Dept., 156 Idaho 739, 743, 330 P.3d 1097, 1101 (Ct. App. 2014) (Hymas It
citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002). However, the appellate
court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Id., citing Ward v. PortneufMed. Ctr., Inc., 150
Idaho 501, 504, 248 P.3d 1236 (2011).
C.

Argument
The district court erred in determining Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654, is a public record not

exempt from disclosure pursuant to Idaho Code

§

74-105(4)(a)(i) and Idaho Administrative

Procedures Act 06.01.01.135.06. The district court did not properly limit its inquiry and applied

7

an erroneous standard to invalidate the agency's rule and the exemption created by that rule.
Furthermore, the district court's decision as to Exhibit 40, Bates 654 was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
A Public Records Act proceeding presents a limited inquiry for the district court: whether
particular public records are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to a narrowly construed
exemption to the Public Records Act. Hymas v. Meridian Police Dept., 156 Idaho 739, 743, 330
P.3d 1097, 1101 (Ct. App. 2014) (Hymas I). This is an objective inquiry for the district court, and
the court presumes that records are open to the public unless the withholding agency demonstrates
that an exemption applies. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 97, 320 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2014); LC.§
74-102(1) (presumption that all public records in Idaho are open). As records are presumed to be
open to the public, the claimed exemption to the Public Records Act must be narrowly-construed,
and the withholding agency at all times bears the burden of proving that the redacted or withheld
records fit within a narrowly-construed exemption. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796, 53 P.3d
1211, 1215 (2002); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise City. 128 Idaho 459, 463, 914 P.2d 21,
25 (1996); Dalton v. Idaho Dairy Products Commission, 107 Idaho 6, 11, 684 P.2d 983, 988
(1984).
Additionally, to maintain a claim of exemption, the withholding agency must demonstrate
a reasonable probability that the disclosure of each withheld record could result in potential harm,
and provide evidence showing the harm that may result. Hymas v. Meridian Police Dept., 156
Idaho 739, 747, 330 P.3d 1087, 1105 (Ct.App. 2014) (Hymas I). The harm demonstrated must be
specific to the withheld document, rather than generalized or categorical. Hymas v. Meridian
Police Dept., 159 Idaho 594, 602, 364 P.3d 295, 303 (Ct. App. 2015) (Hymas II). However,
Respondents need not demonstrate that the claimed harm will occur if a particular record is

8

disclosed, only that harm is reasonably probable. Id. If Respondents fail to meet their burden of
demonstrating that a record falls within a narrowly-construed exemption and its disclosure is
reasonably likely to result in an identified harm, then the court must order the disclosure of the
record. See, e.g., Dalton, 107 Idaho at 9; LC.§ 74-116. However, if the withholding agency does
meet this burden, the trial court must enter an order supporting the agency's decision refusing
disclosure and must not require disclosure of the record. LC.§ 74-116.
In a Public Records Act proceeding, the district court must make an objective inquiry into
whether a withheld record falls within a narrowly-construed exemption to the Public Records Act
and whether an identifiable harm would be reasonably probable to result if the record were publicly
disclosed. This is the extent of permissible inquiry in such a proceeding. Wade v. Taylor, 156
Idaho at 96; LC.§ 74-115; LC.§ 74-116. A Public Records Act proceeding is not the appropriate
forum to debate the legality or ethics of the death penalty. Nor is it a permissible forum to
challenge the prudence of existing exemptions to the Public Records Act or the validity of a
withholding agency's rules. A Public Records Act proceeding is clearly distinct from a proceeding
brought under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, which is the appropriate forum to
challenge an agency's statutory constructions. See, e.g., J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Com'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 1220 (1991). Proceedings under the Public Records
Act place the parties in entirely different postures, involve different standards of review, and
impose different penalties or remedies on the parties, as compared to proceedings under the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act. It is erroneous to conflate the Public Records Act proceeding here
with a proceeding under the APA, and thereby use the proceeding to invalidate the agency's rule
and the exemption to the Public Records Act created by that rule.

9

The district court erred in determining Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654, is a public record not
exempt from disclosure pursuant to Idaho Code

§

74-105(4)(a)(i) and Idaho Administrative

Procedures Act 06.01.01.135.06. This decision was in error for three reasons. First, the district
court conflated this Public Records Act proceeding with a proceeding brought under the APA
when the court imposed an APA-style review to analyze, and ultimately invalidate, Board Rule
135.06. The district court did not properly limit its inquiry to the only issue presented in a Public
Records Act proceeding: whether the withholding agency can demonstrate that the withheld
record falls into a narrowly-construed exemption to the Public Records Act and its disclosure is
reasonably likely to result in an identified harm. Instead, the district court erroneously expanded
its inquiry to consider the validity of Board Rule 135.06. The district court, having invalidated
Board Rule 135.06, then erroneously engaged in its own weighing of the interests described by
Idaho Code

§

74-105(4)(a)(i). Second, the district court erred in its weighing of the interests

described by Idaho Code

§

74-105(4)(a)(i) when the court determined that the public interest in

confidentiality did not clearly outweigh the public interest in disclosure. This finding was not
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

In fact, the overwhelming weight of the

evidence at trial demonstrated that the public interest in confidentiality clearly outweighed the
public interest in disclosure of Exhibit 40, Bates 654. Third, the district court did not properly
apply the "reasonable probability of harm" standard elucidated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in
Hymas. The district court erred when it determined that the Respondents had not demonstrated a
specific harm that would be reasonably probable to occur if Exhibit 40, Bates 654 were publicly
disclosed. The overwhelming weight of the evidence at trial demonstrated that a specific harmthe inability of the Idaho Department of Correction to carry out a statutory duty-would be
reasonably probable to result if Exhibit 40, Bates 654 were disclosed.

10

1. The district court did not conduct a permissible inquiry for a Public Records Act
proceeding, but instead conflated the Public Records Act proceeding with proceedings
brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, and thus erroneously analyzed and
invalided Board Rule 135.06 and the exemption created by that rule.
The district court properly noted that this matter was a proceeding pursuant to the Public
Records Act not the Administrative Procedures Act (Am.R., p. 1869). The district court also
correctly noted that whether a record is exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act is
an objective inquiry for the court. However, the court failed to afford appropriate deference to the
IBOC and IDOC in the creation of exemptions to the Public Records Act, specifically exemptions
created pursuant to Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i), and the application of those properly created
exemptions.
Whether a record is exempt from disclosure is an objective inquiry for both the records
custodian and the district court. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho 91, 96, 320 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2014).
The first inquiry for the district court is whether the requested records are public records. If the
court determines the requested records are public records, the court presumes the records are open
to the public, unless the withholding agency demonstrates that an exemption applies. Id. at 97; LC.
§

74-102(1) (presumption that all public records in Idaho are open). To maintain a claim of

exemption, the withholding agency must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the disclosure
of each withheld record could result in potential harm, and provide evidence showing the harm
that may result. Hymas v. Meridian Police Dept., 156 Idaho 739, 747, 330 P.3d 1087, 1105 (Ct.
App. 2014) (Hymas I). The withholding agency must prove the likelihood of harm from disclosure
of a document through evidence that is specific to the withheld record, rather than generalized or
categorical. Hymas v. Meridian Police Dept., 159 Idaho 594, 602, 364 P.3d 295, 303 (Ct. App.
2015) (Hymas II). However, though the evidence must be specific, it need not demonstrate that
the harm will occur if the record is disclosed, only that such harm is reasonably probable. Id.
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At all times, the withholding agency bears the burden of demonstrating that an exemption
applies to a withheld record. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho at 96. As the Public Records Act
presumes that all public records in Idaho are open, the withholding agency also bears the burden
of proving that the redacted or withheld records fit within a narrowly-construed exemption. Bolger
v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796, 53 P.3d 1211, 1215 (2002); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Boise
City. 128 Idaho 459, 463, 914 P.2d 21, 25 (1996); Dalton v. Idaho Dairy Products Commission,
107 Idaho 6, 11, 684 P.2d 983, 988 (1984). If it is not obvious that a record falls within a narrowlyconstrued exemption, then the record is not exempt. Id. If Respondents fail to meet their burden
of demonstrating that a record falls within a narrowly-construed exemption and its disclosure is
reasonably likely to result in an identified harm, then the court must order the disclosure of the
record. See, e.g., Dalton, 107 Idaho at 9; I.C.

§

74-116. However, if the withholding agency does

meet this burden, the trial court must enter an order supporting the agency's decision refusing
disclosure and must not require disclosure of the record. I.C.

§

74-116.

The case law is clear that the district court must make an objective inquiry as to the
application of claimed exemptions to each withheld or redacted record. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho
at 96. Respondents concede that the requirement for an objective inquiry by the district court
prevents the court from deferring solely to the withholding agency in determining whether a
particular record fits within a narrowly-construed exemption. This does not mean, however, that
the district court's inquiry is unlimited or that the agency's rule-making decisions are not entitled
to deference. In fact, the district court's objective inquiry in a Public Records Act proceeding is
quite limited. The district court's objective inquiry is focused on whether the withheld or redacted
record at issue falls within a narrowly-construed exemption. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho at 96; I.C.
§ 74-115; I.C. § 74-116. A Public Records Act proceeding is not the appropriate forum to contest

12

whether particular exemptions created by statute or agency rule are desirable or prudent. Rather,
the only objective inquiry for the district court is whether the withholding agency's action was
justified by a finding that the record falls within a narrow exemption. Thus, the only inquiry for
the district court was whether an existing exemption, when narrowly construed, applied to permit
the continued withholding of Exhibit 40, Bates 654.
A. The district court improperly engaged in a rule-making, rather than a public records,
analysis.

On appeal, this Court should find that the district court erred by engagmg m an
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") review analysis in a Public Records Act proceeding.
Though the district court clearly stated that this matter was a proceeding under the Public Records
Act and therefore the court was not required, or indeed entitled, to grant deference to the agency,
the district court did, in fact, engage in an APA-style review of Board Rule 135.06. The district
court simply did so without also granting IBOC the deference it would have been granted pursuant
to the APA. This Court should find the district erred when it determined that Board Rule 135.06
did not properly weigh the interests described in Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i), and erred in
engaging in its own weighing. By determining that Board Rule 135.06 did not create a valid
exemption to the Public Records Act, absent the court's own weighing, the court conducted an
APA-style review of Board Rule 135.06.
As previously noted, a Public Records Act proceeding is not the appropriate forum to
challenge the validity of an agency rule. Proceedings pursuant to the Public Records Act place the
respective parties in substantially different postures than those brought pursuant to the APA. In
proceedings pursuant to the Public Records Act, the district court is faced with two primary
inquiries: (1) whether the documents requested are public records, and (2) if the documents are
public records, whether an exemption applies. Wade v. Taylor, 156 Idaho at 97. The district court
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presumes records are open to the public unless expressly proved otherwise, and narrowly construes
exceptions to the Public Records Act. Id. If the district court finds that a narrowly construed
exemption to the Public Records Act applies to a withheld document, the court must uphold the
agency's withholding of the record. LC.§§ 74-115; 74-116. The inquiry for a district court in a
Public Records Act proceeding is not whether an exemption was properly created by an agency,
but whether the existing, narrowly construed exemption, applies to a particular withheld document.
That is the extent of the court's inquiry under the Public Records Act when determining whether
records were properly withheld by an agency.
In contrast, a proceeding pursuant to the APA is a direct challenge to an agency's
interpretation of statutes and its rule-making authority. One of the inquiries for a court in an APA
proceeding can be whether, and to what extent, an agency's statutory construction should be
followed. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206,
1220 (1991). In such proceedings, the court is required to defer to the judgment of the agency as
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, and is constrained in its review of the agency's
decision-making. LC. § 67-5279. Additionally, a court's review of an agency rule or action
pursuant to the APA is clearly meant to give deference to the agency and guide the agency, as
agency actions that are not affirmed must be remanded for further proceedings of the agency, as
necessary. LC. § 67-5279. This is in stark contrast to the punitive nature of the Public Records
Act in the event a reviewing court deems the agency's decision withholding records to be frivolous
or in bad faith. LC.§§ 74-116; 74-117.
Proceedings under the Public Records Act and the AP A are distinct and place the parties
m substantially different postures.

In proceedings under the Public Records Act, only the

disclosure or withholding of records is at issue, whereas under the APA, the agency rule itself is
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at stake. Despite the district court's recognition that the proceeding at issue was brought under the
Public Records Act, not the AP A, the district court conflated the relevant inquiries involved in
these distinct proceedings by scrutinizing the process used by IBOC to adopt Board Rule 135.06,
determining that process was insufficient pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i), and therefore
conducting its own weighing under Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) rather than finding that Board
Rule 135.06 created an applicable exemption.

The district court erred in conflating these

proceedings. On appeal, this Court should determine that the district court should have found that
Board Rule 135.06 created an exemption to the Public Records Act, and should then have applied
that exemption to Exhibit 40, page 654.
B. Even if the district court properly engaged in a rule-making analysis, the district court
erred by failing to grant deference to IBOC in its rule-making.
If this Court, on appeal, determines that the district court did not err in scrutinizing IBOC' s
rule-making with regard to Board Rule 135.06, this Court should still determine the district court
erred by not affording IBOC deference in its rule-making. Here, the district court should have
afforded deference to IBOC in determining that Board Rule 135.06 provided a properly created
exemption to the Public Records Act pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i).
Though Respondents submit that this matter is a not a proceeding brought under the APA,
and therefore the court should have simply found an exemption to the Public Records Act existed,
case law discussing the deference to be given to an agency construction of a statute is instructive
here in the event this Court determines the district court was justified in considering whether Board
Rule 135.06 is valid. The Idaho Supreme Court has developed a four-prong test to determine the
deference to be given an agency. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849,
862, 820 P.2d 1206, 1220 (1991).
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First, the court must determine whether the agency has been entrusted with the
responsibility to administer the statute at issue. J.R. Simplot, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d
at 1220. The Idaho Board of Correction has clearly been entrusted with the responsibility to
administer LC. § 74-105(4)(a)(i). The IBOC has been expressly granted the control, direction, and
management of the state penitentiary. Idaho Constitution, art. X., § 5; LC. § 20-209; Burge v.
State, 90 Idaho 473, 476, 413 P.2d 451, 452 (1966); Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 232, 392
P.2d 279,281 (1964); State v. Reese, 98 Idaho 347,348, 563 P.2d 405,406 (1977). In accordance
with this grant of authority, the Idaho Legislature enacted Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, creating
the IBOC to control, direct, and manage Idaho's correctional facilities, and provide for the care
and maintenance of all prisoners in its custody. Idaho Code§§ 20-212 and 20-244 empower the
Board to make and adopt rules for the management of prison administration. Waggoner v. State,
121 Idaho 758, 760, 828 P.2d 321, 323 (Ct.App. 1991). Because the Legislature cannot foresee
all practical difficulties IBOC may encounter while fulfilling its statutory duties, IDOC, an
administrative agency, possesses any explicit or implied powers that are reasonably necessary to
implement expressly granted powers. Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 666, 669
(2011).
Idaho Code §§ 19-2716 and 19-2716A grant IDOC specific authority to carry out
executions. As previously stated, the death penalty is permissible under Idaho Code and Idaho's
Constitution. As IDOC is tasked with administering and executing a death sentence, the Board's
rulemaking power extends to executions. Properly conducted executions are integral to fulfilling
the necessary, and expressly legislatively granted, powers of the Board. Lethal injection is the
only lawful means of execution in the State ofldaho. LC. § 19-2716. The evidence produced at
trial demonstrated that disclosing the identity of a source of lethal injection chemicals may
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interfere with IDOC's ability to obtain sources of lethal injection drugs, and therefore hinder the
Department's ability to carry out executions. Board Rule 135.06 recognizes that carrying out an
execution is an expressly legislatively granted power of the Board and Department and reflects the
probability of harm to the ability to carry out this power if certain information is disclosed. IDAP A
06.01.01.135.06.
The Board properly promulgated Board Rule 135.06 pursuant to Idaho Code § 74105(4)(a)(i), which exempts from disclosure records of the department of correction "of which the
public interest in confidentiality, public safety, security and habilitation clearly outweighs the
public interest in disclosure." In this statute, the Legislature explicitly permitted the Board to
identify such records pursuant to its authority under section 20-212, Idaho Code. LC. § 74105(4)(a)(i). This is a broad grant of authority to IBOC. The Board is entitled to make "all
necessary rules" to carry out its powers unless "inconsistent with express statutes or the state
constitution." LC.§ 20-212. The Board is also exempted from most requirements of Chapter 52,
Title 67, Idaho Code (IDAPA), including the requirement to make findings for or vote on new
rules.

LC. § 20-212(1).

Thus, though Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) imposes a weighing

requirement upon IBOC, the statute does so while referring to the Board's broad authority and
limited administrative rule-making requirements under Idaho Code § 20-212. The Board was
specifically entrusted to administer Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)( a)(i) and was granted broad discretion
in its rulemaking authority and identification of exempt records pursuant to that statute.
The second prong requires that the agency's construction of the statute be reasonable. J.R.
Simplot, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1220. Here, the evidence produced at trial
demonstrated that the agency's construction of Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) is reasonable.
Respondents stipulated at trial, and concede on appeal, that IBOC did not explicitly conduct the
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balancing test referenced in Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) prior to promulgating Board Rule
135.06. Yet, as previously noted, no explicit findings or procedures are statutorily required of
IBOC. The concerns raised by the agency prior to the trial in this matter and the evidence presented
at trial, demonstrate that Board Rule 135.06 is a reasonable construction of Idaho Code § 74105(4)(a)(i). Specifically, the evidence at trial demonstrated that the interest in the confidentiality
of the identity of the source oflethal injection chemicals is high, as public disclosure of the source's
identity may jeopardize the ability of IDOC to carry out an execution. As IBOC and IDOC are
tasked with carrying out lawfully ordered executions in the State of Idaho, it is reasonable to place
a high importance on the public interest in confidentiality when considering information that could
jeopardize the ability of IDOC to carry out a statutory duty of that agency.
Third, the court must determine whether the statutory language at issue expressly addresses
the precise question at issue. J.R. Simplot, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1220. Here,
the statutory language at issue is contained in the Public Records Act, specifically Idaho Code §
74-105(4)(a)(i). Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i) provides that certain records ofIDOC are exempt,
specifically those in which "the public interest in confidentiality, public safety, security and
habilitation clearly outweighs the interest in disclosure as identified pursuant to the authority of
the Idaho board of correction under section 20-212, Idaho Code."

I.C. § 74-105(4)(a)(i)

(emphasis added). This statutory language does not address specific records of the department,
and in fact expressly defers to the Board's authority to identify the records which must remain
confidential pursuant to its rule-making authority. Though this statutory provision imposes a
balancing test on IBOC, it also provides that the Board identify exempt records pursuant to its
authority under Idaho Code§ 20-212. As previously noted, Idaho Code§ 20-212 exempts IBOC
from almost all requirements of the AP A, including any that would be applicable to conducting or
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documenting a balancing test conducted pursuant to Idaho Code §

74-105(4)(a)(i).

The

Legislature is assumed to know the effect of its laws. Yet, the Legislature did not impose any
additional requirements upon IBOC in the identification of exempt documents, and did not specify
that the undertaking of the balancing test must be expressly noted or otherwise documented by the
IBOC. The lack of express minutes or other documentation of the balancing test does not render
Board Rule 135.06 inconsistent with Idaho Code §

74-105(4)(a)(i) or any other statutory

prov1s1ons.
The final prong in determining the amount of deference to afford an agency is whether
some of the rationales underlying the rule exist. J.R. Simplot, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 862, 820
P.2d at 1220. If some of the rationales exist and others are absent, the court must engage in a
balancing test and ultimately determine whether a "cogent reason" exists for denying the agency
deference. Id. Five rationales were discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in J.R. Simplot, Co.,
Inc.: (1) repose (i.e., whether the Legislature has allowed the rule to persist unchallenged), (2)
whether the agency's interpretation is practical, (3) legislative acquiescence, (4) contemporaneous
agency interpretations, and (5) agency expertise. Id. at 863-866, 1221-1223. The rationales most
strongly favoring agency deference here are the practicality of the agency's interpretation,
legislative acquiescence, and agency expertise.
The agency's interpretation of the statute at issue is practical. As previously noted, the
agency has been granted the express authority pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 74-105(4)(a)(i) and 20212 to identify certain records of the department of correction that are exempt from disclosure.
Idaho Code§§ 19-2716 and 19-2716A impose a duty upon the department to carry out executions
while Idaho Code §§ 20-212 and 20-244 empower the Board to promulgate rules necessary to
carry out the express or implied powers of the IBOC and IDOC. Board Rule 135.06 exempts from
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disclosure information that "could jeopardize the ability of the department to carry out an
execution." As carrying out executions is an express power and responsibility ofIBOC and IDOC,
any rule that protects from disclosure information that, if disclosed, could jeopardize the ability to
carry out executions, safeguards the ability of the department to perform this responsibility. The
evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the disclosure of a source's identity could jeopardize
the ability of the department to carry out executions. Thus, the Board's interpretation of Idaho
Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i) to protect from disclosure information that could jeopardize the
department's ability to carry out an execution, and the Department's interpretation of the Board
Rule to exempt the identity of the source, are practical and supported by the evidence at trial.
The Idaho Legislature has acquiesced to the Board's extensive rule-making authority. The
Legislature has granted the Board extensive authority to promulgate any rules necessary to carry
out its responsibilities and has continued to grant the Board wide discretion in promulgating rules
related to its duties in Idaho Code § 20-212 since 1947. Additionally, Board Rule 135.06 has
existed since 2011, and the Legislature has not invalidated that rule.
The agency also has expertise and uses this expertise when promulgating rules. The Board
and Department are granted wide discretion because they are viewed as possessing expertise. As
previously noted, IDOC is granted the authority to carry out executions. LC. §§ 19-2716; 192716A. The Public Records Act clearly exempts certain records of IDOC and charges the Board
with conducting the necessary balancing test and identifying which records must remain exempt
to allow the IDOC to carry out its legislatively mandated mission. LC. § 74-105(4)(a)(i). The
Legislature offers no guidance and imposes no requirements for the performance of this weighing,
but instead specifically refers to the broad authority of the Board pursuant to Idaho Code§ 20-212.
The Legislature relied upon the Board's expertise and knowledge to make these determinations.

20

C. Conclusion
The rationales discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in J.R. Simplot, Co., Inc. support a
grant of deference to the agency in promulgating rules pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i).
Though Respondents concede that such deference would not be given in an objective inquiry into
whether a particular record fits within a narrowly-construed exemption, the district court should
have afforded the agency deference in determining that Board Rule 135.06 is valid and does
properly create a narrowly-construed exemption to the Public Records Act. Finding that Board
Rule 135.06 constitutes an appropriate exemption, the district court should then have refrained
from conducting its own balancing test pursuant to LC. § 74-105(4)(a)(i). The only proper
objective inquiry would have been for the court to determine whether the withheld documents were
exempt pursuant to Board Rule 135.06 as the challenged record could jeopardize the ability of the
department to carry out an execution.
Though Respondents discuss the factors elucidated by the Idaho Supreme Court in J.R.
Simplot, Co., Inc., here, this Court should determine that these factors are relevant when an
agency's statutory construction is challenged in an AP A proceeding, not when the district court is
charged with determining whether particular public records were exempt from disclosure pursuant
to the Public Records Act. This Court should determine that the district court erred in addressing
the validity of Board Rule 135.06 and subsequently engaging in its own weighing process pursuant
to Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i). Here, the only inquiry for the district court was whether an
exemption to the Public Records Act, specifically that created by Board Rule 135.06, applied to
Exhibit 40, Bates 654. It was not within the district court's purview to determine whether Board
Rule 135.06 should be accepted as an appropriate statutory construction of Idaho Code § 74105(4)(a)(i).
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The evidence at trial demonstrated that Board Rule 135.06 did create an exemption to the
Public Records Act. The only remaining challenge for the district court, then, was to apply this
exemption to Exhibit 40, Bates 654. As will be discussed more fully in the next section, the
evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that Exhibit 40, Bates 654 falls within the exemption created
by Board Rule 135.06 as the record's disclosure could jeopardize the department's ability to carry
out an execution. The district court should have applied Board Rule 135.06 to conclude Exhibit
40, Bates 654 is exempt from disclosure.
2. The district court erred in its weighing of the interests described by Idaho Code § 74105(a)(i) and erroneously determined that the public interest in confidentiality did not
clearly outweigh the public interest in disclosure as related to Exhibit 40, Bates 654.
This finding was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The evidence
at trial demonstrated that the document clearly falls within the narrow exemption
created by Board Rule 135.06.
Even if the district court was permitted to engage in its own weighing of the interests
described in Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i), the district court did not properly weigh the interests.
The district court's finding that the public interest in confidentiality did not clearly outweigh the
public interest in disclosure with respect to Exhibit 40, Bates 654 was not supported by substantial
and competent evidence.
Following a court trial on Cover's public records request, the district court concluded that
Respondents had failed to demonstrate that Exhibit 40, page 654 is exempt from public disclosure
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a) and IDAPA 06.01.01.135.06, which specifically exempt
certain records that, if disclosed, could jeopardize the ability of the department to carry out
executions. (Am.R., p. 1888). Accordingly, the district court ordered that Exhibit 40, page 654 be
disclosed to Cover in response to her September 21, 201 7, request. This finding was not supported
by substantial and competent evidence and was not arrived at by an exercise of reason.
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, as "it is settled that capital
punishment is constitutional, '[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a [constitutional] means
of carrying it out."' Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2732-33 (2015), citing Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 47, 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008). The death penalty is permissible under Idaho Code and Idaho's
Constitution, and IDOC is tasked with administering and executing a death sentence. LC. §§ 192716 and 19-2716A. The only lawful means of carrying out a death sentence in Idaho is through
lethal injection. LC. § 19-2716.
Both Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i) and Board Rule 135.06 recognize the sole authority of
the IBOC in promulgating rules related to and carrying out executions and IDOC in carrying out
executions. Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i) carves out exemptions for IBOC and IDOC in the Public
Records Act. Board Rule 135.06 specifically exempts certain records that, if disclosed, could
jeopardize the ability of the department to carry out executions.

Both the statute and rule

acknowledge that certain records of IDOC must remain exempt to enable IDOC to satisfy its
statutory responsibilities.
Board Rule 135.06 was promulgated by the Idaho Board of Correction in 2011, and was in
effect at the time of Cover's request in September 2017. This rule specifically provides that "[t]he
Department will not disclose (under any circumstance) the identity of the onsite physician; or staff,
contractors, consultants, or volunteers serving on escort or medical teams; nor will the Department
disclose any other information wherein the disclosure of such information could jeopardize the
Department's ability to carry out an execution." Board Rule 135.06 was specifically adopted
pursuant to the authority conferred on the IBOC in Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i), which provides
that certain documents of the department of correction are exempt from public disclosure. Exempt
documents include "[r]ecords of which the public interest in confidentiality, public safety, security
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and habilitation clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure as identified pursuant to the
authority of the Idaho board of correction under section 20-212, Idaho Code."

I.C. § 74-

105(4)(a)(i).
Although the district court considered the application ofboth Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i)
and Board Rule 135.06 to Exhibit 40, Bates 654, it did not adequately address the competing public
interests enumerated in Idaho Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i) and the application of Board Rule 135.06 as
they relate to IDOC' s ability to carry out its statutory execution duties. The public has an interest
in its governmental agencies carrying out their lawfully prescribed duties.

Substantial and

competent evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the public disclosure of the identity of a
source of lethal injection chemicals to departments of correction may impede the ability of IDOC
to obtain execution drugs in the future. If IDOC is unable to obtain execution drugs, it is unable
to carry out lawfully imposed death sentences.
A. There is a strong public interest in protecting the source of execution drugs.
Evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Respondents have consistently relied upon
Board Rule 135.06 to withhold information and records that would identify sources of lethal
injection chemicals used by IDOC for executions since 2011. In its response to Cover's initial
public records request, the department explicitly noted that the request was being denied, in part,
pursuant to Board Rule 135.06. (Exhibits, p. 2707). Jeff Zmuda, who was the Deputy Director of
IDOC and had been employed with IDOC in various capacities for over thirty years at the time of
trial, testified that he relied upon Board Rule 135 in withholding Exhibit 40, Bates 654. (Trial
Transcript, p. 220, L. 16). Zmuda further testified at trial that the identifying information of
suppliers oflethal injection chemicals is exempt pursuant to Board Rule 135.06 because the public
disclosure of such information may interfere with the department's ability to carry out an
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execution. (Trial Transcript, p. 331, Ls. 1-3). In further support of this concern, Zmuda testified
that he has personally experienced difficulty in obtaining sources oflethal injection chemicals who
are willing to provide the chemicals to departments of correction. (Trial Transcript, p. 291, Ls. 34). Zmuda's testimony was further bolstered by the accounts of other witnesses at trial.
Jeanne Woodford, a correctional consultant with nearly 30 years of experience with the
California Department of Corrections, testified that when the identities of pharmaceutical
companies who had supplied lethal injection chemicals to departments of correction were
disclosed to the public in other cases, "anti-death penalty groups would organize protests [of that
company], either in writing or in person." (Trial Transcript, p. 456, Ls. 17-24). Woodford reported
knowing of these instances from her communications with directors of other departments of
correction throughout the nation. (Trial Transcript, p. 456, Ls. 17-24). Woodford conceded that
the public disclosure of the identity of a source could delay, or even permanently prevent, an
execution. (Trial Transcript, p. 457, Ls. 8-9).

Woodford also admitted that it has become

increasingly difficult for departments of correction to obtain a willing supplier of lethal injection
chemicals. (Trial Transcript, p. 465, Ls. 4-16). Woodford could not testify to the reason for the
difficulty, as she indicated she had not been employed with the California Department of
Corrections since 2006, and therefore had no involvement with obtaining lethal injection chemicals
since that time. (Trial Transcript, p. 465, Ls. 4-16).
Stephen Silberman, an Industrial Organization Economist, testified at trial that one of the
most obvious effects of disclosing the identity of a lethal injection chemical source would be to
enable the public to boycott that source. (Trial Transcript, p. 484, Ls. 13-14). Silberman further
agreed that one goal of a boycott is to change the company's behavior. (Trial Transcript, p. 491,
Ls. 7-11). For companies subject to boycotts for supplying departments of correction with lethal
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injection chemicals, the obvious change in behavior desired by the boycotters would be for the
source to terminate its supply of those chemicals to corrections departments. Silberman agreed
that a boycott of one source that provided lethal injection chemicals to departments of correction
could have chilling effects on others in that same industry engaged in the same boycotted behavior.
(Trial Transcript, p. 492, Ls. 4-10).
Cover testified that one of the main interests of the public in knowing the identity of a
source would be to enable the public to stage boycotts against the source. (Trial Transcript, p. 624,
Ls. 11-25). Cover agreed that one purpose of obtaining information about past sources of lethal
injection chemicals would be to boycott that source. (Trial Transcript, p. 624, Ls. 11-18). Cover
also conceded that it has become increasingly difficult for departments of correction to obtain
lethal injection chemicals. (Trial Transcript, p. 626, Ls. 6-25). Although Cover did not definitively
conclude that the disclosure of lethal injection chemical sources has resulted in the increased
difficulty of obtaining chemicals, Cover did describe a correlation between the increased difficulty
of obtaining sources and the greater secrecy exercised by departments of correction regarding
sources. Cover admitted that one possible explanation of this correlation is that departments of
correction are becoming more secretive regarding sources in an effort to preserve their remaining
sources. (Trial Transcript, p. 626, Ls. 3-13).
Testimony from several witnesses concerning the difficulty in obtaining lethal injection
chemicals was bolstered by media articles the district court considered in Exhibit 40. The district
court specifically referred to a May 2012 article that cited the difficulty in obtaining lethal injection
chemicals to explain the change in Idaho's execution procedures between the Rhoades execution
in November 2011 and the Leavitt execution in June 2012. (Am.R., p. 1827, 1 15). The United
States Supreme Court has likewise recognized the challenges faced by departments of correction
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when attempting to obtain legal injection drugs, and directly attributed these obstacles to the
actions of anti-death-penalty advocates who pressured pharmaceutical companies to refuse to
supply execution drugs. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2733 (2015).
The testimony presented at trial, coupled with the other evidence noted by the district court,
clearly demonstrated the strong public interest in confidentiality related to the source of lethal
injection chemicals. The evidence showed that identifying a source of lethal injection chemicals
could impact the willingness of both the identified source and other sources engaged in the same
conduct to supply execution drugs to departments of correction. Increased difficulty in obtaining
a source of lethal injection chemicals could then jeopardize the ability of IDOC to carry out an
execution, as lethal injection is the only lawful manner of executing an individual in Idaho. LC. §
19-2716.
B. There is minimal public interest in the disclosure of Exhibit 40, Bates 654.
In contrast to the strong evidence of a public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
lethal injection chemical sources to secure the ability of IDOC to comply with its statutory
execution duties, little evidence was presented that would tend to show a public interest in
disclosure. Exhibit 40, Bates 654 contains identifying information of the source used in the 2012
execution of Richard Leavitt. (Trial Transcript, pp. 324-325, Ls. 24-2).

Though the source

identified in that document was used in the Leavitt execution, the document itself is not related to
the Leavitt execution. Rather, Exhibit 40, Bates 654 is a letter from the source agreeing to provide
IDOC with lethal injection chemicals for executions subsequent to the Leavitt execution. (Trial
Transcript, p. 218, Ls. 23-25). Zmuda testified at trial that the source never produced chemicals
pursuant to the agreement as no subsequent executions were conducted. (Trial Transcript, p. 221,
L. 2). The source identified in Exhibit 40, Bates 654 does not have an existing contractual
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relationship with IDOC and is no longer available to provide chemicals. (Trial Transcript, p. 220,
Ls. 21-24). Exhibit 40, Bates 654 contains the company's name and contact information, the name
of a representative of the company, and the name and contact information of the company
representative's family member. (Trial Transcript, pp. 219-220). As the record is not related to
the chemicals actually used in the Leavitt execution, or any execution, the document does not
contain any information about the drug used in an execution (e.g. batch or lot number, chemical
name or ingredients, chain of custody, storage information). Thus, the only information that the
public would obtain from disclosure of Exhibit 40, Bates 654 is the identity of the source, the
source's representative, and the representative's family member.
Dr. Lynn Paulsen, a retired pharmacist with about 45 years of experience, testified that
knowing the identity of a source would not demonstrate whether a specific drug or dose used in an
execution was stable, potent, or "safe." (Trial Transcript, p. 531, Ls. 8-15). Paulsen further agreed
that revealing the source of execution drugs used in an execution would not provide the public
with information about whether the execution caused suffering for the condemned. (Trial
Transcript, pp. 532-533, Ls. 25-22). Zmuda testified at trial that the source identified in Exhibit
40, page 654 was a compounding pharmacy at the time of the 2012 execution. Thus, Paulsen
testified at length regarding the quality control issues she observed when auditing multiple
compounding pharmacies. (Trial Transcript, pp. 510-521 ). Paulsen indicated that the concerns
were so significant, that the health system for which Paulsen was employed terminated their
contracts with twenty-five of the sixty-one pharmacies Paulsen audited. (Trial Transcript, p. 513,
Ls. 18-20).

Interestingly, when discussing her survey of compounding pharmacies, Paulsen

testified that "all of those on paper looked good." (Trial Transcript, p. 521, L. 7). This is significant
because how the pharmacy looks "on paper" is the only information that could be reasonably

28

discovered if Exhibit 40, Bates 654 were released now nearly eight years after the named source
provided drugs to IDOC. It was clear from Paulsen's testimony that very little information of
public interest could be acquired simply from the source's identity or how the source looked "on
paper" nearly a decade ago.
Cover testified that she knows of no evidence showing that the 2011 or 2012 executions
were "botched" or caused suffering to the condemned individuals. (Trial Transcript, pp. 627-629).
Cover also admitted that knowing the source oflethal injection chemicals used in the 2011 or 2012
executions would not provide the public with information about whether other sources or
alternatives were available to IDOC in 2011 or 2012. (Trial Transcript, p. 631, Ls. 18-25).
Based on the nature of the information contained in Exhibit 40, Bates 654, and the
testimony presented about the limited usefulness of that information in determining the
effectiveness and humaneness of the drug used in the 2012 Leavitt execution, it is clear that there
is very little public interest in disclosure of this document.
C. The evidence produced at trial does not support the district court's findings.
That the district court's findings related to Exhibit 40, Bates 654 are unsupported by
substantial and competent evidence is apparent from the court's disparate treatment of Exhibit 40,
Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655. This is also apparent from the court's conclusion that Exhibit
40, Bates 654 be disclosed in completely unredacted form.
The evidence presented at trial does not support the disparate treatment of Exhibit 40, Bates
654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655. Unlike Exhibit 40, Bates 654, the district court concluded that the
Respondents had met their burden with respect to Exhibit 40, Bates 655, and thus could continue
to withhold most of that document.

Both documents contain similar information, including

information that would identify the supplier. (Trial Transcript, pp. 219-220; p. 222, Ls. 16-23).
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Exhibit 40, Bates 655 was described at trial as a DEA form that provides a chain of custody for
execution chemicals. (Trial Transcript, p. 222, Ls. 12-13). Zmuda testified that Exhibit 40, Bates
655 was a form directly related to the 2011 execution of Paul Ezra Rhoades, and thus contains
information on both the source and actual drugs used in the 2011 execution. (Trial Transcript, p.
325, Ls. 9-24). Both documents relate to executions that were completed over five years before
Cover's 201 7 public records request. According to the testimony, revealing the source's identity
contained in either document would not provide significant information to the public regarding
whether the drugs used in the 2011 or 2012 executions were effective and humane. The testimony
related to the challenges faced by departments of correction in obtaining lethal injection chemical
suppliers and the chilling effect of protests and boycotts of suppliers is equally applicable to both
sources. Zmuda evinced similar uncertainty as to whether either source possessed the appropriate
licenses or was subject to oversight at the time of the executions. (Trial Transcript, pp. 324-326).
This information could minimally support a public interest in disclosure given Paulsen's testimony
that, in general, an unregulated pharmacy would be more likely to produce unstable or impotent
drugs (Trial Transcript, p. 537-538, Ls. 22-9). Zmuda's uncertainty regarding the regulatory
processes to which the sources identified by Exhibit 40, Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655 were
subject at the time those sources provided execution drugs to IDOC was equal as to both sources,
and thus the minimal public interest in disclosure related to that issue was also equal as to both.
The only difference between the two sources presented at trial was that the source identified
by Exhibit 40, Bates 654 was not, at the time of trial, able to provide lethal injection chemicals to
IDOC because the source, at that time, did not meet regulatory requirements. (Trial Transcript, p.
220, L. 21). Zmuda was not able to testify whether the source identified by Exhibit 40, Bates 655
was available or unavailable to IDOC. The district court does not provide any cogent reason for
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treating these two documents differently, and the evidence produced at trial does not support such
disparate treatment where the testimony and evidence demonstrating the strong public interest in
confidentiality applied equally to both Exhibit 40, Bates 654 and Bates 655. The evidence at trial
clearly supports that the documents should be treated the same. The evidence further clearly
demonstrates that both documents are exempt pursuant to Board Rule 135.06.
The district court compelled the disclosure of Exhibit 40, Bates 654 m completely
unredacted form. (Am.R., p. 1888). In addition to source-identifying information, Exhibit 40,
Bates 654 also contains the identifying information of a family member of the source (Trial
Transcript, pp. 219-220). The identification of a family member unrelated to the 2011 and 2012
executions is not responsive to Cover's request, and is information for which the public interest in
confidentiality is high, and the public interest in disclosure nonexistent. The court's failure to
exempt this information further supports the conclusion that the district court's findings related to
Exhibit 40, Bates 654 are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.
D. Conclusion
A Public Records Act proceeding is limited to the determination of whether particular
records are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to a narrowly construed exemption to the
Public Records Act. Hymas I, 156 Idaho at 743, 330 P.3d at 1101. It is not the forum to debate
the constitutionally, legality, or ethics of the imposition of the death penalty. The death penalty is
constitutional in the United States and Idaho. As such, there must exist a constitutional means of
carrying out the death penalty. Glossip. 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2732-33 (2015), citing Baze v Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 47, 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008). In Idaho, the Idaho Department of Correction is tasked with
administering and executing a death sentence through lethal injection, which is the only lawful
method of carrying out a death sentence in Idaho. LC.§§ 19-2716 and 19-2716A. In recognition
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ofIDOC's statutory responsibilities related to executions, IBOC promulgated Board Rule 135.06
which exempts from public disclosure any information that could jeopardize the ability of the
department to carry out an execution. The Idaho Board of Correction promulgated this rule
pursuant to the express authority granted in Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i). Though the district
court considered the application of both the statute and the rule to Exhibit 40, Bates 654, the district
court failed to give adequate weight to the public's interest in its governmental agencies carrying
out their lawfully prescribed duties, including executions, and gave too great weight to the court's
view of the public interest in the disclosure of a source.
Substantial and competent evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the public
disclosure of the identity of a source of lethal injection chemicals to departments of correction may
impede the ability of IDOC to obtain execution drugs in the future. If IDOC is unable to obtain
execution drugs, it is unable to carry out lawfully imposed death sentences. Thus, the evidence
demonstrated that there is an overwhelming interest in confidentiality related to the identity of the
source oflethal injection chemicals to IDOC as there is a reasonable probability that, if the identity
of the source were revealed, IDOC would suffer the specific, identified harm of being unable to
carry out its statutory duties related to executions. The evidence at trial failed to demonstrate more
than a minimal interest in the public disclosure of Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654, especially where
that document identifies a source used by IDOC in 2012 and where the document provides no
information about any actual chemicals received by IDOC or used in any execution. The evidence
established that the minimal public interest in disclosure of an agreement to potentially provide
execution drugs that were never actually provided was outweighed by the significant public
interest in ensuring IBOC and IDOC are able to carry out their statutory duties.
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Thus, the district court's conclusion that Respondents had not met their burden with respect
to Trial Exhibit 40, Bates 654 was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and was
therefore in error.
3. The district court did not properly apply the "reasonable probability of harm" standard
elucidated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Hymas.
The district court correctly noted that, in order to maintain a claim of exemption, the
withholding agency must demonstrate a reasonable probability that disclosure of each withheld
record may result in harm. (Am.R., p. 1876). However, the district court erroneously applied this
standard to Exhibit 40, Bates 654. The district court's finding that Respondents had failed to
demonstrate that a specific harm would be reasonably probable to result from the disclosure of
Exhibit 40, Bates 654 was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Hymas I held that a withholding agency bears the burden
of demonstrating that the disclosure of each withheld record could result in potential harm, and
provide evidence showing the harm that may result. 156 Idaho at 747, 330 P.3d at 1105. The
withholding agency must prove the likelihood of harm from disclosure of a document through
evidence that is specific to the withheld record, rather than generalized or categorical. Hymas II,
159 Idaho at 602, 364 P.3d at 303. However, though the evidence must be specific, it need not
demonstrate that the harm will occur if the record is disclosed, only that such harm is reasonably
probable. Id. The proper inquiry for the district court is to determine whether the withholding
agency provided sufficient proof that connects a reasonably probability of a specific harm to the
production of each withheld document. Hymas II, 159 Idaho 594 at 602.
Here, the district court found that Respondents had not met their burden to show a
reasonable probability that a specific harm would result from the disclosure of Exhibit 40, Bates
654. (Am.R., p. 1888). The district court did, however, find that Respondents had met their burden
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to show a reasonable probability that a specific harm would result from the disclosure of Exhibit
40, Bates 655 (Am.R., p. 1889). This disparate treatment of the two documents when determining
whether there is a reasonable probability that harm could result from the disclosure is consistent
with the district court's disparate treatment of the documents when balancing the competing
interests described in Idaho Code § 74-105(4)(a)(i).

Respondents incorporate herein their

arguments against the disparate treatment of Exhibit 40, Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655 as
elucidated in Section 2 of this Argument. Just as there is no cogent reason to treat Exhibit 40,
Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655 differently when addressing the public interests in
confidentiality and disclosure, there similarly exists no cogent reason for the disparate treatment
of these two records when determining the probable harm that could reasonably result from
disclosure.
Respondents incorporate herein their discussion of the evidence produced at trial, as
described in Section 2 of the Argument above. Specifically, Respondents note that the specific
harm identified was the same for both Exhibit 40, Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655: that
disclosure of the source could jeopardize the department's ability to carry out lawfully ordered
executions, for which the department is statutorily responsible. The evidence on this harmincluding the increasing difficulty of obtaining lethal injections drugs testified to by Zmuda,
Woodford, Cover, and Paulsen, and the chilling effect of boycotts on both identified and
unidentified suppliers testified to by Silberman-was the same and applied equally to both Exhibit
40, Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655. Though the evidence of probable harm presented by
Respondents cannot be generalized or categorical, it can be common to several withheld
documents. Hymas II, 159 Idaho 594 at 602. Respondents have previously described the minimal
differences between Exhibit 40, Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655. None of those differences
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mitigated the risk of harm linked to the disclosure of either document, and none of the differences
justified the disparate treatment of these two records.
The district court's disparate treatment of Exhibit 40, Bates 654 and Exhibit 40, Bates 655
again demonstrates that the district court's findings as to the harm of disclosure of Exhibit 40,
Bates 654 are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Respondents met their burden
to demonstrate a specific harm that would be reasonably probable to result if the records were
disclosed.
II.

As the prevailing party on appeal, Respondents are entitled costs.
If Respondents are the prevailing party on appeal, Respondents are entitled to costs

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40.
CONCLUSION
A Public Records Act proceeding presents a limited inquiry for the district court: whether
records withheld from disclosure pursuant to a Public Records Act request fall within a narrowlyconstrued exemption to the Public Records Act and whether the disclosure of the withheld records
would be reasonably probable to result in a specific, identified harm. Here, the district court
erroneously expanded its inquiry to analyze, and ultimately invalidate, the withholding agency's
rule which created the relied-upon exemption. After invalidating Board Rule 135.06, and the
exemption created by the rule, the district court then engaged in its own weighing under Idaho
Code§ 74-105(4)(a)(i). This weighing was in error. The district court's findings that Respondents
failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that Exhibit 40, Bates 654 fell within a narrowlyconstrued exemption to the Public Records Act and its disclosure would be reasonably likely to
result in an identified harm were not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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Respondents request this Court vacate the district court's judgment and peremptory writ
requiring the disclosure of Exhibit 40, Bates 654, and deem Exhibit 40, 654 exempt from disclosure
under the Public Records Act as it fits within a narrowly-construed exemption created by Board
Rule 135.06 and its disclosure would be reasonably likely to cause a specifically identified harm.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2020.

Is/ Jessica Kuehn
JESSICA KUEHN
Deputy Attorney General
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